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Yield Management 
FORUM 
YIELD W A G E M E N T  
Carlos Alberto Castro Peiia 
HISTORY 
Historically, airlines have ope&ted in a tightly regulated environment. This environment has been regulated 
by governments and self-regulated through organizations such as the International Air Transport Association 
(KTA) 
The early airliie policy for the fare activities was based on offering all the seats on the airplane (or in the 
coach of the airplane) at the same rate. When the industry entered the 1960s with bigger and faster planes, new 
types of fares were being approved by the Civil Aeronautical Board (CAB) on certain routes, including lower-night 
coach fares, and tour-basing fares. There were no capacity controls on these fares. All of the seats were up for 
grabs and were sold on a first come, first-served basis, provided only that the conditions of the fares were met. 
By the end ofthe sixties, airliies were looking at day-of-week load factor patterns and introduced midweek 
and weekend fare dierentials to stimulate new demand for low load factor flights. High-season and Low-season 
differential fares were also in place. 
At the same time as these new fares were being implemented, the move toward deregulation of the 
economic aspects of the airline industry was gaining speed. By the mid 1970s the carriers were aware that 
deregulation was going to happen. Intra state carriers like Southwest Airlines in Texas and Pacific Southwest in 
California, which were not subject to federal fare regulations, were filling up their planes with a low-cost, low-fare 
product and making money doing it. This caught the attention of consumers, legislators and regulators alike. 
DEREGULATION 
A revolution in the airline industry occurred with 
airline deregulation. Deregulation began a series of events 
that changed forever the U.S. domestic airline industry and 
increasingly affects the airline industry worldwide. During 
the evaluation of this new law or Deregulation as is known, 
there was a good deal of controversy, Howard W. Cannon, 
who was a United States Senator, and Alfied E. Kahn 
fonner Chairman ofthe CAB, had strong opinions in fhvor 
of Deregulation. Important elements of their testimony are 
expressed below: 
1. The need for competition in the market~lace. The 
-
three forces of supply and demand in the market 
could do a better job of allocating resources than 
a central authority. Artificial barriers to exit and 
entry fiom the market would be eliminated, 
encouraging new firms to compete and fixes to be 
established on a competitive basis. Inefficiency 
would not be rewarded with higher k e s  to cover 
marginal routes. Instead, carriers could drop 
unprofitable routes. 
2. Commuter carriers could best serve low-density 
- 
markets. Smaller carriers with appropriate 
equipment could better serve low-density traffic 
points than lager carriers, which received either a 
subsidy or higher h e s  to cover the costs of 
serving such points. 
Among the persons against of the Deregulation 
were George McGovern, former United States Senator and 
Albert V. Casey, former President of American Airlines, 
Inc. The following are important aspects oftheir testimony: 
1. Regulation has served the vublic interest as well 
-
as the interests of the carriers. Regulation has 
checked the forces that might create extreme 
JAAER, Fall 2001 Page 7 
1
Castro Pena: Yield Management
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2001
Yield Management 
competition on the one hand or monopoly on the 
other. Evidence of success is the fact that the rise 
in passenger fixes over the years has been lower 
than the rise in the Consumer Price Index. 
2. Unbridled com~etition would result in only 
-
ternDorarv allocative efficiency. Carriers would 
undercut each other's Ewes with the eventual 
result that only the larger companies would 
survive (survival of the fittest). Fares would then 
rise when few competitors remained in the 
market. I 
3. Smaller communities might lose service. 
-
Commuter carriers might not be willing or able to 
serve some markets. Furthermore, the community 
might not accept them once the established carrier 
dropped service. 
When Deregulation did happen it changed the industry in 
important ways: 
1. ' Route entry. On January 1, 1982, the CAB lost 
-
virtually all of its control over entry into the air 
transportation business or entry by carriers intro 
new markets. Under the new law, a certificate is 
still required, but it has generally been fieely 
given, regardless of the statutory fitness standard. 
However, despite the i c t  that carriers have picked 
up a number of formerly dormant and other new 
certificates in the past five years, very few ofthese 
certificates have been utilized. The economic 
recession in the early 1980s unquestionably, was 
a major fbctor. 
2. Route exit. The revised law allows the air carriers 
- 
much greater flexibility in dropping markets than 
1958 act. Which mandated and extensive CAB 
approval process. Under the revised law, a carrier 
has only to give the CAB 9O-days' notice of its 
intention toexit a particular community. However, 
during a 10-year transition period, the CAB (and 
the department of transportation after 1985) has 
been given the power to require the last carrier 
serving a community to maintain what is called 
"essential air service" until a suitable replacement 
carrier can be found. Congress also guaranteed 
subsidy to provide service to such communities if 
needed. 
3. Rates and Fares. As of January 1,1983, the CAB 
-
effectively lost all of its authority over airline 
passenger fires (it already had lost most of its 
power over air fieight rates by that date) Although 
the carriers still maintain a private system of 
passenger and air fieight taris, the old system of 
tariff filling and the lengthy approval process have 
been abolish. 
4. Federal ~reem~tion. Until the 1978 act, there were 
no federal statutes preempting state economic 
regulation of air transportation. The new law 
provides that no state or political subdivision and 
no interstate agency may enact or enforce any law 
or regulation concerning rates, routes or services 
of any carrier to provide interstate air 
transportation. The intent here was to preclude the 
possibility of having 50 CABS. 
One ofthe most tangible results ofthis revolution 
was an explosion in the number of fixes offered in the 
marketplace. Fare aspect was a very critical area for airline 
growth, and the lack of technology had a direct effect on 
We policy. For instance, fires were published in books 
which reservations agents used to identi5 the appropriate 
Wes for a given markets. Because the pricing of an 
itinerary was manual, rules and hres had to be relatively 
simple. Also, because the books had to be printed and 
distributed, fixes could not change very often. With the 
advent of Computer Reservation System (CRS) and its 
cousins the Global Distribution System (GDS) tariff books 
became a thing of the past and prices could change very 
rapidly. 
In this time of period (1970s), the demand for 
more discount fire products increased dramatically. The 
Civil Aeronautical Board responded by easing regulations 
for charter airlines, and opening the way for several new 
types of charter products. However, discount k e s  for 
scheduled airlines were still highly restricted and limited to 
certain markets. The charter airlines began to offer what 
were called "public charters" that would enable them to sell 
seats on what amounted to quasi-scheduled service. 
The threat of the public charter was a matter of 
great concern for all scheduled airlines. When the airlines 
reached the point where they could no longer reduce costs, 
they returned to the search for better technology. However, 
no airline was completely prepared for the scope of changes 
caused by deregulation to the pricing environment. 
The airlines developed new procedures and 
technology in order to be the largest carrier. Many wanted 
to become not only a national carriers, but an international 
one as well. Each wanted to be the airline of the business 
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traveler. Everyone tried to out-do the other to attract this 
customer, including fkequent flier programs, special 
privileges for high-mileage travelers and new aircraft. The 
new aircraft were a critical part of this growth. Customers 
clearly preferred new to old, or so management hoped. One 
ofthe most worried airlines in this new environment was 
American. Years later, American CEO, Bob Crandall, who 
was the Senior Vice-president-Marketing fbr the airline, 
explained the mood "This was driving us crazy. They were 
going to fly from New York to California for some amount 
of money that was a hell of a lot less than we had to 
charge." He was talking, ofcourse, about the bublic charter. 
American had to find a way to compete but they could not 
possibly produce seats as cheaply as the charter airlines, or 
so they initially thought. 
Their planes were currently flying, on average, 
half-empty. They were already producing seats cheaper 
than the charter operators could hope to produce. "If we 
could figure out a way to sell those empty seats at the prices 
the charter guys proposed," thought Crandall, 'We would 
make a lot of dough." However, there were huge problems 
to be overcome. Those were preventing the people who 
would pay the higher lire fkom switching to the lower fares 
and ensuring that only those seats that would otherwise fly 
empty were sold at the lowest fare level. This was the 
beginning of modern day Revenue Management. 
American's Solution was called "Super Saver 
Fares," which were capacity-controlled, restricted discount 
fares. It was introduced to the market on April 25, 1977. 
This methodology was highly successful. The challenge 
was just beginning for them as they realized how carefidly 
the availability of the Super Saver seats needed to be 
controlled in order to maintain profitability. 
They started the new system with basic allocations 
of about 30% of the seats on each flight assigned to Super 
Saver discount fares, and also to complement the system 
they implemented new strategies, such as advance 
purchase. Discount seats required 2 1 -day advance purchase. 
If they did not allocate enough seats lir enough in advance, 
the planes would depart with empty seats. 
Before long, however, American's executives 
recognized the hct that each flight behaves difFkrently by 
time of day and day of week. Therefore, they began to study 
the behavioral characteristics of each flight, on each day of 
the week. In addition large computer systems were 
developed to forecast and monitor passenger demand. The 
objective was to sell the right seat to the right passenger for 
Yield Management 
the right price at the right time. 
The inventory seat method became a system, and 
it was Bob Crandall who is credited for giving this, the 
initial inventory management process a formal name. He 
thought, the term, 'veld" was commonly used to measure 
revenue per passenger mile, so, recognizing that the seat 
allocations aflkted the passenger yield, Crandall decided 
to call it "Yield Management". 
YIELD MANAGEMENT 
Despite widespread allegations that deregulation 
resulted in billions of dollars in consumer saving, the truth 
is that prices were fklling Wer before deregulation than 
after it. Inflation-adjusted yields declined 2.5% annually 
fkom 1950 to 1978; they fell only 1.7% a year after 1978. In 
the decade preceding 1978, fuel adjusted real yields fell 
2.7% annually; in the decade following promulgation ofthe 
Airline Deregulation Act of that year, fuel adjusted yields 
declined only 1.9% a year. 
In addition, the full fare has risen to such 
prohibitive levels that only those who absolutely must will 
pay it (only 10% of passenger do). 
It is for all these reasons the airlines sought the 
best way to optimize their profits, developing different 
methods, and strategies that would allow the companies to 
maximize revenues. The best option created was the Yield 
Management. Its philosophy was used by different 
companies under different names, as is every new 
technology, or process, but it showed itself to be most 
effective. It brought the stability needed for the airlines to 
continue in the aviation business, and to fend off the 
innovative charter carriers. 
Yield Management or Revenue Management as is 
also known, can be defined as the process of selectively 
accepting or rejecting reservations requests to maximize 
revenues. The basic premise behind airline yield 
management is relatively simple: make seats that are 
expected to go unsold available at a lower fare to the 
passenger who would otherwise not travel, while at the 
same time ensuring that these lower fares are not purchased 
by passengers who are willing and able to pay a higher fare. 
The optimal mix of short-haul and long-haul passenger in 
an airline route network is obtained by selling the right seat 
to the right customer, at the right price, at the right time to 
maximize system revenues and profitability. This goal is 
accomplished by setting reservation availability based on 
the value of the reservation request. 
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The success ofRevenue Management in the airline 
h e  wars of the early 1980's was the validation of an 
important new management technique. In 1987, The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology awarded a Doctor of 
Philosophy degree Peter Belobaba for his description of the 
4 airline f k e  optimization issue and the development of the 
Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) model. This was 
the first widely applied optimization method for controlling 
the number of discount seats airlines offer. 
EfiFective airline yield management msists of two 
distinct components (Belobaba 1987a) as follows: 
Differential pricing: this is the practice of 
offering a variety of k e  products differentiated 
in terms of service amenities and /or travel 
restrictions, at a variety of price levels. 
Seat Inventory control: this is the practice of 
determining the number of seats on a flight to be 
made available for sale to a particular h e  
product, limiting low-he seats and protecting 
seats for later-booking, by higher-fsre 
passengers, as necessary. 
The principal tool used by the airlines for 
developing Yield Management has been the effective and 
consistent use of technology. The level of technology is a 
very important aspect to develop in order to achieve the 
goals of the system and of course of the company because 
the level of technology dictates the sophistication of the 
Yield Management process to generate incremental 
revenues. It is the reason that many carriers have been 
gaining revenue advantages (as opposed to cost 
advantages). This fgct has historically been the justification 
for carriers to spend millions of dollars developing, even 
more sophisticated yield management systems. 
Yield management systems are extremely 
complicated to set up and maintain. They require complex 
hardware and software. They demand a constant stream of 
data. Prices under these systems are set and reset 
fiequently, often many times each day. 
Collecting reservations holding data periodically 
fiom a reservations system is a relatively straightforward 
process, since data are already stored at this level of detail. 
From the demand fmecast generated, leg-or segment-based 
inventory controls are then computed and updated on the 
airline's host Computer Reservations System (CRS). 
Indeed the first phase in the evolution ofthe Yield 
Management was the developing of the relatively basic 
simple database management systems designed to collect 
Page 10 
and store historical flight booking data. Periodic (usually 
nightly) extracts or "snapshots" of the current inventory 
and booking levels in the airline's reservation system are 
downloaded and stored in a historical booking database. 
The secondgeneration YieldManagemat systems 
compare historical booking patterns were generated from 
the database with actual bookings on future flights, and 
they issue "exception reports" to the analyst, listing only 
those future departures that meet a predetermined set of 
criteria. 
The kct is that CRS is one of three key reasons, 
which have precipitated the growth of the airline industry 
fiom a predominantly regional industry to a national and 
international industry dominated by mega carriers. The 
other two keys are internal yield management automation, 
which is clearly represented in the third phase in the 
evolution of Yield Management systems. It involved the 
incorporation of mathematical models for forecasting, 
optimization, and over booking. The third key reason is the 
developing of the extensive hub system now in place. 
OBJECTIVES 
What is the purpose of the Revenue Management? 
How does it work? How should an inventory analyst 
determine discount seat allocation? 
The purpose ofthe Revenue Management or Yield 
Management is to maximize the revenue of the airlines. 
Another goal ofthis methodology is to reduce the consumer 
surplus. The consumer surplus is defined as the benefit that 
a consumer obtains when he or she can get a service or 
product with a lower price considering that the consumer 
would otherwise pay a higher price. The yield management 
also pennits the airlines to established their prices 
strategies and respond quickly to changes in prices of their 
competitors. Additionally, Yield Management tries to 
manage the supply/demand relationship for a market 
controlling the capacity or output and its price. This 
methodology has been very important for the airlines after 
deregulation because the price and frequency are the 
principals indicators for the consumers. 
The Revenue Management works as follow. The 
airlines recollect historical data of the number of 
passengers that have traveled and how much they paid in 
each class. With this information, the airline estimates the 
demand fiinction for every class. The demand estimation is 
very critical because it permits the airline to know the 
elasticity or sensitivity of the consumer to the change in 
prices. The demand function also permits built the 
JAAER, Fall 2001 
4
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 11, No. 1 [2001], Art. 6
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol11/iss1/6
Yield Management 
probability that one passenger or group of passenger get 
this h e .  With this information the airline knows how 
people respond to its prices and the expected number of 
passengers. After that the airline establishes the capacity 
and the prices and compares the estimated booking with the 
real one. When the kre classes are not 111 and the flight is 
approaching to the departing, the analysts take the decision 
about if they have to open a new class or give a bigger 
discount. This is in a very basic idea of how Yield 
management works. Some new concepts have been 
developed such as Virtual nesting. This tecpique permits 
the airlines to manage the revenue for a flight that goes 
through a network instead of analyzing just one leg or 
market. 
For a better understanding of the Yield 
Management an example is shown fiom Northwest airlines. 
How can the analyst determine the number of 
discount seat allocations? Let us, suppose that we have the 
distribution frequency for the Class Y, Class B and C of 
certain flight in certain market. The Class Y is the 111 kre  
and B and C are discount classes and are nested. It means 
that the total number of seats equals to Y. The information 
is presented in the next table. 
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Table 1 Expected Marginal Seat Revenue 
Page 12 JAAER, Fall 2001 
Class Y 
Fare 200 
Av. # 
PAX 15 
SD 7 
ACC. Expected Marginal 
Pax Probability Seat Revenue 
1 97.7 ' 195.4500 1 100.00% 1 19.9998 
2 96.80% 1 93.6700 2 100.00% 1 19.9995 
3 95.70% 191.3500 3 100.00% 1 19.9987 
4 94.20% 188.3900 4 1 00.00% 1 19.9961 
5 92.30% 1 84.6900 5 100.00% 1 19.9893 
6 90.1 0% 180.1500 6 100.00% 1 19.9720 
7 87.30% 174.6900 7 99.90% 1 19.9307 
8 84.10% 168.2700 8 99.90% 1 19.8380 
9 80.40% 160.8600 9 99.70% 1 19.6424 
10 76.20% 1 52.4900 10 99.40% 1 19.2548 
I 1  7 1.60% 143.2300 1 1  98.80% 1 18.5330 
12 66.60% 133.1800 12 97.70% 1 17.2699 
13 61.20% 122.4900 13 96.00% 115.1929 
14 55.70% 1 1 1.3600 14 93.30% 11 1.9831 
15 50.00% 100.0000 15 89.40% 107.3220 
16 44.30% 88.6400 16 84.10% 100.9613 
17 38.80% 77.5 100 17 77.30% 92.8047 
18 33.40% 66.8200 18 69.10% 8219754 
19 28.40% 56.7700 19 59.90% 71.8447 
20 23.80% 47.5 100 20 50.00% 60.0000 
2 1 19.60% 39.1400 2 1 40.10% 48.1552 
22 1 5.90% 3 1.7300 22 30.90% 37.0245 
23 12.70% 25.3100 23 22.70% 27.1952 
24 9.90% 19.8500 24 15.90% 19.0386 
2 5 7.70% 15.3100 25 10.60% 12.6779 
26 5.80% 11.6100 26 6.70% 8.0 168 
27 4.30% 8.6500 27 4.00% 4.8070 
28 3.20% 6.3300 28 2.30% 2.7300 
29 2.30% 4.5500 29 1.20% 1.4669 
30 1.60% 3.2100 30 0.60% 0.745 1 
Class Y 
Fare 120 
Av. # 
PAX 20 
SD 4 
Acc. Expected Marginal 
Pax Probability Seat Revenue 
Class Y 
Fare 100 
Av. # PAX 35 
SD 15 
6
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The total of Passenger in class Y is 30. Now the question is 
the following: using the information in the table how many 
seats of Y, B and C do we have to allocate? The answer is 
psy, if we have the demand estimation module that gives 
us the distribution of the number of people per type of fim. 
In this case, we h o w  that on average 15 people fly in class 
Y. Using the concept of Expected Marginal Seat Revenue 
(EMSR: multiply the cumulative probability for the 
passenger X by the fhre level) we can estimate how many 
seats of Y we have to sell. In this case is 13'because this is 
the point where the EMSR is equal to our next fire level in 
this case is 120. The same logic can be applied to the class 
B. The next class, fare C, is 100 so we have to sell 16 seats 
of B and then we can follow the same procedure time after 
time. In conclusion, we have to sell: 
13 seats of Y class @ 200 dollars 
16 seats of B class @ 120 dollars 
1 seat of Class C @ 100 dollars 
Total expected revenue: $4.260 
It is the work developed by the Yield 
Management analyst, who studying every market 
movement and collecting daily information to maintain 
their database completely update, and producing the 
more responsible and reliable decision for the company. 
Yield or Revenue Management is a procedure 
that looks for maximizing the demand curve in order to 
obtain the most revenue for the company. 
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Figure 1 Demand Curve 
Prices \ 
Revenue = Seats X Price 
Revenue = 50 X 80 1 
Revenue = 4000 
I 25 50 75 100 . 125 Seats 
I 25 50 75 100 125 Seats 
Finure 2 Demand Curve 
. 
r 
Prices 1 OC 
Revenue = 75 X 60 
Finure 3 Demand Curve 
Prices 100 
Revenue = 2500 
Revenue = 4500 2C 
I 25 50 75 100 125 Seats 
\ 
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The revenue is obtained applying a basic 
mathematical operation, which is based on calculating the 
area below the curve. In this case, it is that of a geometric 
figure, a rectangle, and its area represents the calculated by 
the formula of multiplying base by height. 
The initial thought could be to sell all the seats at 
the highest price, but just a limited quantity of people 
would be willing and able to pay this fare, and therefore 
this fare will generate less revenue than selling some seats 
at reduced cost However, as it is shows on this graphic the 
highest quantity of persons willing and able fo pay for the 
seat are found at the lowest price, as the demand laws 
establish "the demand of a product rises as its prices Mls*. 
However, low prices could result in a losses for the airline 
due to this price will generate a lower revenue than the 
revenue expected selling part of the seats at the highest 
price. 
The most convenient solution for this flight will be 
sell the seats at thk price B where the more highest quantity 
of people will be willing and able to pay the fare for the 
seats. This strategy can also insure that the total revenue for 
the flight will be the highest. 
CONCLUSION 
Deregulation has tended to generate a greater 
number of alternative fares and to increase both fare and 
schedule volatility. In a volatility environment, airlines 
have to decide quickly which of their competitor's actions 
need to be matched and which are of little consequence. An 
airline also has greater opportunity in such environments 
to take a proactive approach towards its own pricing tactics. 
Yield Management has been one of the most 
important tools used by the airlines for maintaining the 
stability of its business. Claims have been made that a 
good, basic yield management system can boost revenues by 
up to ten percent. It can also impose management 
discipline. Traffic is tangible and clearly visible at 
departure time whereas, in the absence of a YMS, revenues 
and yields are known only days or weeks later and profits 
come to light even firther into the future. Yield statistics 
might not be disaggregated on a segment-by-segment or 
route-by-route basis. Airlines could not know their behavior 
on specific market or route. Thus, they could not establish 
or even change their marketing strategies. The benefits of 
Yield Management are clear. 
Finally, the utility of Yield Management is not 
limited to getting a few incremental bottoms onto otherwise 
empty seats. It can form the technological basis 
underpinning much wider limited-period promotions, 
combining the advantages of both filling off-peak capacity 
and raising or reinforcing and airlines market profile. 
Yield Manangement are vital in a competitive 
market, particularly when the competition has such a 
system deployed. Nonetheless, it also need to be treated 
with caution, for the following reasons. 
Yield Management models are simply tools which 
airlines can use to help them slide up and down the demand 
curves for individual products. These can control the speed 
and extent of the slide. What they cannot do is create 
demand which is profitable in the long run if people are 
unwilling to pay the prices to ensure profitability, given the 
nature ofthe products offbred and a particular airline's cost 
structure. In addition, YMS cannot create demand for a 
specific market. There are many cases related with airlines 
which did not develop the system in the best way, such as 
was the case of the big white and blue American airline 
"Pan Am*. Pan Am flew empty airplanes to places such as, 
Pago Pago, Rabat, Monrovia, Lagos. "In 1968, Pan Am 
announced that it would o& nonstop 707 service to 
MosaW? In the Soviet Union? Who in 1968, other than the 
odd tourist and few spies, would pay to travel to Moscow?" 
Why, just ' k u s e  we are Pan h, and we supposed to fly 
exotic places". In the specific case of Pan Am, we can find 
in the books Skygods, comments such as "We built this 
airline," or fiom the services director who said "The Pan 
Am culture was in our blood." Pan Am as well as other 
airlines showed that it and other companies were not 
prepared to cope with the challenge of a fiee market caused 
by Deregulation.0 
Carlos Alberto Castro Peiia is a graduate student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He expects to receive his Master 
in Aeronautical Science degree with specializations in management and safety in July 2002. He worked for Aserca Airlines in 
his native Venezuela before pursuing his graduate degree. 
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